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of jury trial, for example, is part of a larger argument (which we consider in more detail 
in Unit D3): that such discourse shows a tension between two different ways of talking 
about (and in fact conceptualising) what is going on, use of narrative and legal 
exposition. For Heffer, what is important is that these two kinds of discourse together 
produce the ‘complex genre’ he describes, addressed simultaneously to two different 
audiences. But Heffer’s general account may turn out to be more suggestive if 
considered alongside participant-focused observations about witness behaviour of the 
kind made by Conley and O’Barr (2005). They argue that how different litigants 
structure information can be categorised as being either rule-oriented or relational, 
based on informant interviews or analysis of conversational moves and sequences. What 
is significant from their point of view is that legal proceedings are receptive dispro ­
portionately to the former. If the contrast they put forward is justified, then there may 
be implications that go beyond the scope of any one of the studies described above on 
its own concerning the effectiveness of the justice system as a whole. 
Such implications can be seen more clearly if findings from the different kinds of study 
are brought together. In their deliberations, for example, judges restructure relational 
accounts into legally relevant categories in order to pursue their own form of reasoning. 
In an empirical study conducted by Conley and O’Barr, however, members of the 
judiciary ‘described relational litigants as hard to follow, irrational, and even crazy, while 
praising the straightforward efficiency of rule-oriented accounts’ (Conley and O’Barr 
2005: 73). Opposing that preferential treatment, Conley and O’Barr maintain (on the 
strength of sociolinguistic findings and research on reasoning in other fields) that 
relational accounts are not illogical, but simply follow a different kind of logic from the 
sort of reasoning a court can easily accommodate. For Conley and O’Barr, issues 
regarding courtroom discourse are in this way not only questions for scholarly analysis, 
but matters calling for practical reform, if litigants with legal claims of equal merit fare 
differently because they show different kinds of communi cative competence. Their 
research (e.g. O’Barr and Conley 1990) shows a strong connection between witness 
background, greater satisfaction and less frustration with the (US) justice system when 
witnesses are able to use more narrative forms in small, informal courts or in tribunals 
or alternative dispute resolution (ADR; usually mediation) settings. 
B5 LINGUISTIC STRATEGIES USED BY LAWYERS 
In this unit, we introduce and discuss the main features of courtroom persuasion. We 
examine a series of examples of rhetorical techniques deployed at different stages of a 
trial in Unit C5. 
Awareness of audience 
Persuasion involves ‘a deliberate effort to change a person’s attitude’ (Bradshaw 2011: 
1). To persuade judges and jurors successfully, lawyers must combine attention to their 
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message with attention to how they present that message, including by means of 
non-verbal communication such as facial expressions, gaze, body language, silences 
and physical distance (Burgoon and Bacue 2003). Advocacy manuals deal with all these 
considerations from a practical, experience-led point of view that reflects law’s 
preference for tradition, cumulative wisdom, and experientially proven outcomes. In 
this unit, we bring together such understandings of advocacy with other approaches 
based on linguistic and related research. 
Advocacy is often regarded as a matter of performance. But it cannot be reduced 
to performance entirely, since it is never unidirectional. Rather, advocacy involves 
implanting an idea or altering an existing idea in someone’s belief system, in a 
courtroom context an idea or ideas that can form the basis of an important later 
judgment. To maximise the effectiveness of their advocacy, lawyers accordingly seek 
intuitively and through training to understand human cognitive bias, which influences 
judges’ or jurors’ perception of information presented to them. This practical approach 
combines with awareness of different audiences; so, in order to reflect necessary 
differences between legal and lay communication, lawyers adapt their persuasion 
strategies to different situations, adjusting in particular to whether a case involves a 
jury trial or a bench trial (i.e. proceedings overseen by one or more judges but no jury). 
Audience awareness (Bradshaw 2011) and the related principle of recipient design 
(structuring a message to reflect the priorities of its recipient rather than the needs or 
wishes of the speaker) are as a result central to advocacy. 
Permissible strategies in advocacy vary between jurisdictions. For example, 
objections based on the manner or purpose of the language used (e.g. on grounds of 
vague or ambiguous questions) are raised more often in US courts than in other 
common-law jurisdictions, largely because in American courts any ground for appeal 
will be treated as having been waived if an immediate objection was not raised (Evans 
1998). In an increasingly international media environment that potentially elides 
important jurisdictional differences in procedure, interactional differences can surface 
in unexpected ways (e.g. in one of our examples in Unit C4, an unrepresented litigant 
in Hong Kong may have been influenced by American courtroom dramas when 
seeking to raise an objection in an impermissible way). 
Speech attributes and style 
In many walks of life, a good public speaker is, at least partly, one who can manipulate 
prosodic features of speech, including pitch, tempo and loudness, intonation, and tone 
of voice, in order to reinforce other stylistic choices. Such characteristics also feature 
in courtroom advocacy. For example, intonation – including sometimes slightly 
exaggerated, ‘stage’ intonation – may be used to express irony or incredulity. The 
advocate may vary tempo, slowing down to let an important point sink in. Rapid 
questioning, on the other hand, may be used to put pressure on a witness. Such 
features are sometimes calculated for effect in a given courtroom situation, and at other 
times appear to be conventional effects that have been acquired from manuals and 
mentors. 
Stylistic selection is not a matter purely of one-off choices. One highly regarded 
advocacy skill is an ability to switch between formal and informal register depending 
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on topic and target audience. Jurors may fail to attend to or understand – or may even 
appear bored by – evidence presented to them. One requirement of verbal com ­
munication to jurors is therefore simplicity, despite the complexity of the subject matter 
and legal framework governing what has to be communicated. 
Most published work on advocacy consists of guidance by and for practitioners. 
Some studies, on the other hand, such as Findley and Sales (2012), claim to analyse 
‘the science of attorney advocacy’, and relate practical advice to more general 
observations and evidence. Chapter 3 of Findley and Sales (2012), for example, presents 
a digest of recommended verbal techniques collected from a range of documents, 
suggesting the following as the main techniques to be adopted: use of familiar language, 
simple words with few syllables, short and linear sentences, attention to thesaurus 
alternatives, and care with figurative expressions. Among more general recommenda ­
tions, they include: avoid ‘legalese’ and baby talk, humanise the client, and insert what 
they call ‘memorable impact words’ and details. 
Perhaps surprisingly given the adversarial nature of the speech event overall, one 
effective persuasive strategy according to advocacy manuals is to be polite and likeable. 
This is recommended both for lawyers and their clients. Researchers such as Cialdini 
(2008) conclude that we are more persuaded by, and display more trust in, people we 
like. In a courtroom context, one way of appearing likeable is to accommodate 
linguistically to jurors, since psychological research suggests that people like people who 
resemble them. In analysing one US trial, Fuller (2009) showed how lawyers manipulate 
properties of language to communicate messages they would otherwise not be permitted 
to express. She documents how some Southern black attorneys switch from Standard 
US English to African American Vernacular English (AAVE) in order to convey 
solidarity and alignment with African American jurors and in order to show humility. 
Fuller concludes that such style switching is a frequent and clearly marked usage. 
Apart from likeability, credibility is another, more obvious requirement in 
courtroom persuasion. The relationship between speech style and credibility has been 
studied by researchers such as Erickson et al. (1978), who found that testimonies 
containing frequent use of powerless speech attributes such as intensifiers (so, very, 
surely), hedges (kinda, I think, I guess), hesitation forms (uh, well, you know), ques ­
tioning intonations (e.g. use of rising, question intonation in a declarative sentence), 
polite forms (please, ma’am, thank you) and hyper-formality (e.g. use of bookish 
grammatical forms) are perceived as less credible. Such ‘powerless speech’ features are 
commonly used by laypersons (such as witnesses) but avoided by legal professionals. 
Control and coercion in questioning 
In order to influence what jurors think, advocates seek to gain as much control as 
possible over what witnesses say (and, subject to professional and ethical restrictions, 
also what they do not say). Such control is achieved through strategic questioning, often 
by taking advantage of the power asymmetry in the lawyer’s verbal interaction with 
witnesses. Lawyers are generally not allowed to ask leading questions during 
examination-in-chief, but are permitted to ask leading questions during cross-
examination (for comparison with UK law, see Monaghan 2015; for US law, see the 
American Bar Association website at www.americanbar.org). Other restrictions also 
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apply: for example, in the UK, lawyers must not ask questions merely to insult, 
humiliate or annoy a witness. 
Evidential rules in these and other ways limit the types of questions lawyers can 
ask. But lawyers still control topic, pace and duration (e.g. they can put fewer questions 
to a powerful witness and more questions to a weaker one). Lawyers can also use 
coercive question forms, loaded with information that the answerer may find difficult 
to accept but also difficult to refute. In Australia, improper questions (e.g. questions 
that are misleading, confusing or unduly annoying) are prohibited (s. 41, Evidence 
Act 1995). But Cooke (1995: 73) nevertheless reports attempts to ‘upset, unsettle, 
confuse, confound or otherwise intimidate’ witnesses ‘through an aggressive barrage 
of questions’ in Australian courtrooms. Permissibility aside, appearing over-aggressive 
can backfire. There may accordingly be a dynamic trade-off between (as well as 
rhetorical combinations of) the characteristic of being aggressive and being likeable. 
Degree of coerciveness may be highly context-sensitive but it can be described in 
general terms. A typology of coerciveness in questioning is offered, for example, by 
Danet and Kermish (1978), based on how far lawyers control witnesses’ answers during 
cross-examination. Leading questions consisting of a declarative sentence plus tag 
question (e.g. ‘You walked into the room, didn’t you?’; see Unit C4) are considered 
highly coercive: they strongly suggest and limit the answer that can be given, typically 
to ‘yes/no’. A witness would be under increased pressure if he or she gives an 
unexpected, non-compliant and linguistically ‘marked’ answer. Open-ended questions, 
such as ones that start with who, what, where, when and why, are considered less 
coercive. The researchers found that the more coercive the questions, the shorter the 
answers they elicit. 
Dunstan (1980) argues that analysis of coerciveness needs, however, go beyond 
surface linguistic forms (such as question type) and must investigate the contextual 
function and significance of an utterance. Analysing examples in context, he notes 
that cross-examination questions rarely request information. Instead, they counter 
arguments, display incredulity, repair initiations and pre-sequencers, and are to this 
extent primarily forms of accusation. For example, after receiving an unfavourable 
answer, a cross-examiner may pose a follow-up question challenging the previous 
answer (e.g. by pointing to inconsistency, as in ‘But in the police interview, didn’t you 
say that the car park was dimly lit?’ or by requesting justification; Atkinson and Drew 
1979). Alternatively, following a witness’s answer, a lawyer may comment ‘I hear what 
you say’ before turning to the next question, implying disbelief (Evans 1998). Another 
strategy involves reformulation of a previous answer in different words, to make the 
answer fit the questioner’s overall theory of the case. A hypothetical example of this is 
discussed in Danet and Kermish (1978): the witness testifies (in a case in which a car 
accident causes injury to a young person) that she ‘saw a little girl crossing the street 
and a car struck her’. The cross-examiner then asks, ‘Now this little girl darted right 
in front of the oncoming car, didn’t she?’ Substitution of ‘darted’ for ‘crossing’ deflects 
responsibility from the defendant and draws attention to a presumption of erratic 
behaviour by the child. Note, though, that in such examples, the underlying conflict 
between speaker and hearer remains concealed. Even more directly aggressive questions 
are typically masked in polite forms: ‘Would you please, if you possibly can, answer 
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my next question “yes” or “no”. You did not report the donation to your superior, 
correct?’ Examples of further questioning techniques are explored in Unit C5. 
Pragmatic and discourse strategies 
Techniques for indicating reference can also subtly alter a witness’s testimony and 
jurors’ perception of events being reconstructed in the trial narrative. For example, 
lawyers can manipulate personal pronouns to designate in-group and out-group 
boundaries, by including the jurors in a ‘we’ construction while referring to the other 
side in the case as ‘they’. Modals can also be employed to unsettle a witness’s appearance 
of certainty. For example, a witness can be made to sound overconfident when 
presented with a forcefully phrased question: ‘Is there the slightest possibility you might 
have misheard what he said?’ The status of a witness may also be strengthened or 
diminished by adjusting the form of address used towards them (e.g. the contrast 
between ‘John’ and ‘Doctor’; Gibbons 2003). 
Other pragmatic techniques adopted in courtroom advocacy include strategic use 
of interruption (especially when a witness is saying something damaging to the case 
the advocate is seeking to establish); repetition (often with a raised intonation contour 
to cast doubt on an answer that has been provided); overlapping speech; and dramatic 
silence. Pausing after an answer can appear to demonstrate respect for the witness, while 
also giving judges and jurors more time to digest that particular section of an utterance. 
Lawyers may also build credibility by emphasising information that fits into the 
audience’s belief system before gradually introducing arguments that they may find 
difficult to accept if presented in isolation. In jury trials, since opportunities for verbal 
interaction with jurors are limited (except during voir dire in some jurisdictions), 
lawyers make educated guesses about their audience based on professional experience 
and intuition. 
Storytelling 
With an accumulation of evidence and competing accounts surrounding the crux event 
or events at issue in a trial, jurors construct a mental model of what happened, typically 
in the form of a story (Berg 2005). For courtroom purposes, a successful story shaped 
by the lawyer offers a theory of the case that is simple, consistent and compelling; such 
a story is also one that highlights the strengths of the case as perceived from one 
particular point of view, minimising weaknesses. The story leads to an obvious 
conclusion but allows jurors to feel they have solved the puzzle themselves (see 
Bradshaw 2011 for discussion of storytelling techniques in the courtroom). As well as 
in opening and closing speeches, such stories can be created through questions: how 
lawyers can tell a story through a series of questions, rather than by means of more 
conventional narrative techniques, is illustrated in Unit C5. 
The audience for a courtroom story must be able to visualise and imagine it easily. 
Research suggests that a moment-by-moment narrative recounting a crime, in a 
criminal case, is more believable than an abstract statement about the relationship 
between the defendant and the physical event (e.g. probability of DNA matching). As 
in many novels, stories are commonly narrated in the historic present tense in 
courtrooms. Heller (2006: 266) argues that ‘jurors do not decide whether to convict 
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by calculating probabilities or by scrutinizing inferential chains’; instead, he suggests, 
they decide whether a narrative ‘possesses the “lifelikeness” that appears to mark it as 
true’. The potential criticism that other lives are reduced in such advocacy to jurors’ 
own expectations, or even prejudices, is countered by the requirement of supporting 
evidence and the fundamental principle of judgment by peers. 
The proposition that it is easier to impress jurors with stories than with statistical 
information is based on empirical evidence. Wells (1992) reports how, when a mock 
jury was told that 80 per cent of tyres of the Blue Bus Co., but only 20 per cent of the 
alternative Grey Bus Co., matched the tracks of a bus that had killed a dog, few 
(around 10 per cent) found the Blue Bus Co. liable for damages. With a different mock 
jury group, an eyewitness took the witness stand and testified that he saw that the bus 
was blue. Even though the jurors were told that eyewitness accounts have been shown 
to be only 80 per cent accurate in making such identifications, a significantly greater 
number of mock jurors (around 70 per cent) found the Blue Bus Co. liable in this 
condition of the experiment. 
From one perspective, rhetorical strategies are extralegal factors that should not affect 
the outcome of a case in an ideal, rational legal system. On the other hand, legal 
advocacy provides ammunition for lawyers to use, at least in common-law adversarial 
systems, in the knowledge that the outcome of each case will be determined by the 
court after competing submissions and evidence have been presented as coherently and 
vigorously as possible by the respective parties. In this sense, an adversarial (rather than 
inquisitorial) structure for trials depends on competitive testing of arguments and 
evidence followed by detached judgment, even if a different balance of legal, factual 
and emotional components is likely to be found as between bench and jury trials, and 
in other adjudicative forums. 
PRAGMATICS AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION B6 
Unless there is a reason not to, legal interpretation presumes that legislative texts 
are optimal in conveying a legislature’s intention, even if in practice word meaning 
will vary because it is inevitably context sensitive. ‘Construing’ a legal text, as a result, 
involves pragmatic aspects in addition to the semantics of language and the specialised 
forms of reasoning associated with legal rules. In this unit, we outline the role of 
contextual interpretation in legal meaning. We also consider alternative judicial 
approaches to legal interpretation. In conclusion, we broach the question of how closely 
approaches to interpreting legal texts should be expected to resemble linguistic 
understanding of the ways meaning is created in everyday language use. 
Semantic and pragmatic aspects of meaning 
Legal indeterminacy that results from linguistic indeterminacy (such as ambiguity and 
vagueness) seems at first to be concerned with semantic dimensions of meaning: with 
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